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ISLAM AND THE DEATH PENALTY
William A. Schabas'
Capital punishment is not practiced by a majority of the world's states. Anti-
capital punishment domestic policies have led to an international law of human
rights that emphatically prohibits cruel and inhuman punishment. International
concern for the abolition of capital punishment has prompted Islamic states that
still endorse and practice the death penalty to respond with equally compelling
concerns based on the tenets of Islamic law. Professor William A. Schabas suggests
that Islamic states view capital punishment according to the principles embodied
in the Koran. Islamic law functions on the belief that all people have a right to life
unless the administration of Islamic law determines otherwise. Professor Schabas
emphasizes that capital punishment exists in the domestic law of all Islamic states,
but the ways by which these states employ capital punishment are varied and
inconsistent. Although Professor Schabas acknowledges that Islamic states
correctly argue that capital punishment is an element of Islamic law, he maintains
that Islacmic states do not recognize the more limited role of the death penalty
articulated by the Islamic religion.
INTRODUCTION
The debate about the imposition of capital punishment may be as old as the
supreme penalty itself. The circumstances of its imposition and administration, as
well as the wisdom of its use altogether, have preoccupied jurists, scholars,
philosophers, and theologians for many centuries. This debate has been
transformed, in the last half of the twentieth century, with the injection of a new
element, the international law of human rights. Initially addressing the issue
implicitly, with the proclamation of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, in articles 3 and 5 respectively
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' the law has steadily and
inexorably developed in this area.2 By the end of the twentieth century, some sixty
states had ratified international treaties prohibiting capital punishment, and the issue
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' See G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 3, 5 (1948).
2 See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed., 1997).
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itself had become one of the pre-eminent debates in such important international
forums as the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Rome Conference
on the International Criminal Court.
International legal developments were, of course, nothing more than the
reflection of changes in national practice. According to the latest report of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations on the subject of capital punishment,
issued in March 2000, seventy-four states are now totally abolitionist, thirty-eight
are de facto abolitionist, and eleven are abolitionist for ordinary crimes. A total of
123 states are included in one of these three categories. By comparison, only
seventy-one states are listed by the Secretary-General as being retentionist.
According to the Secretary-General, forty-six states have abolished the death
penalty since 1985.'
By the late 1990s, confronted with a growing trend toward abolition and a
desire by many states to insist that domestic policies in the area become a question
of legitimate international concern, some of the ever-shrinking minority of
retentionist states launched an aggressive rear-guard campaign. Although they
failed to prevent exclusion of capital punishment from the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, they succeeded in leaving their mark on the final
product.4 A 1999 General Assembly debate was quite effectively blocked by this
coalition of states favorable to capital punishment.5 It seems almost unquestionable
that new and vigorous confrontations will soon take place along the same lines.
Within the international arena, those states taking the initiative to defend capital
punishment are a disparate lot. The group includes such states as Singapore and
Malaysia, who invoke "Asian values" and whose practical concerns on the matter
seem closely related to the battle against traffic in narcotic drugs. Another active
participant is Rwanda, a country where the death penalty has fallen into abeyance
except for the very specific issue of the appropriate punishment for perpetrators of
genocide. Several members of the Commonwealth or English-speaking Caribbean
are very involved: they generally attribute their interest in the subject to the excited
See Crime Prevention and Ciiminal Justice: Capital punishment and implementation
of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty;
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/2000/3 (2000) [hereinafter
Report].
4 See U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998). Article 80 was inserted as a
compromise to appease States favorable to the death penalty: "Nothing in this Part of the
Statute affects the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law, nor the
law of States which do not provide for penalties prescribed in this Part." On the capital
punishment debate at the Rome Conference, see William A. Schabas, Life, Death and the
Crime of Crimes: Supreme Penalties and the ICC Statute, 2 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 263
(2000).
' See Ilias Bantekas & Peter Hodgkinson, Capital Punishment at the United Nations:
Recent Developments, 1 CRIM. L.F. 23 (2000).
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state of public opinion and, in some cases, high rates of violent crime. But without
any doubt, the core of the campaign that fights further progress of international law
in the area of abolition of the death penalty lies with so-called Islamic states.6
Geographically these countries are located in the Middle East-the state with the
largest Moslem population in the world, Indonesia, plays no role in the debate-
and have governments characterized by repressive, undemocratic policies in a wide
range of areas. This group includes two of the world's leaders in the practice of
capital punishment, in a quantitative sense, namely Iraq and Iran.
This bloc of Islamic states quite regularly and vocally insists that its position
is the inexorable consequence of Moslem law. This Paper will examine the use of
"religious" arguments by Islamic states in the international debates, and then
consider whether a genuine basis exists for them within Moslem doctrine.
I. ISLAMIC STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE
Islamic states only first emerged as a force determined to influence the debate
within the 1980s, as organs of the United Nations prepared a draft protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on abolition of the death
penalty. The Covenant itself, drafted in the 1950s and 1960s, does not prohibit
capital punishment, a source of dissatisfaction for many countries whose domestic
law had evolved importantly in this area. Article 6 of the Covenant recognizes the
right to life, and then delimits its principal exception "[iln countries which have not
abolished the death penalty." These limitations included the restriction of capital
punishment to the "most serious crimes," its outright prohibition in the case of
pregnant women andjuvenile offenders, and an optimistic, progressive exhortation:
"Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant."7 When Article 6 of
the Covenant was being drafted by the Third Committee of the United Nations
General Assembly, Arab and Islamic states played a relatively discrete role in the
debates. When some Latin American countries urged that the "right to life"
provision of the draft covenant expresses an explicit condemnation of capital
punishment, Saudi Arabia answered that not all countries were as fortunate as
Uruguay and Columbia, and that many states had not found it possible to abolish
capital punishment, an issue which was far too complex for the Committee to deal
with in any case.8 The Latin Americans insisted that their abolitionist text be put
to a vote,9 but it was handily rejected on a roll-call vote, by fifty-one votes to nine,
6 See Report, supra note 3, at 129.
' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 6, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
See U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.81 1, § 20.
9 See U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.817, § 29.
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with twelve abstentions. The Arab and Islamic states in the General Assembly at
the time-Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, Yemen-all voted against the resolution, although at no point was it ever
suggested that Islamic law played a role in their position on the subject.
After the text of Article 6 was finalized by the General Assembly's Third
Committee in 1957, debate on the issue of capital punishment shifted to other
instances within the United Nations. A relatively innocuous 1959 resolution in the
General Assembly inviting the Economic and Social Council to begin a study on the
question of capital punishment was supported by Pakistan.'" Opposition to the call
for the study came principally from the Soviet Union and Poland, who insisted that
capital punishment was a matter of domestic jurisdiction and that it should not be
the subject of United Nations studies. This same argument is now a familiar one
from Arab and Islamic states, but they did not raise it in 1959. For the next two
decades these states played a marginal role in United Nations debates on the death
penalty, something that suggests that the issue was on the periphery of their
concerns.
The first sign that things were changing was at the Sixth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in
Caracas in 1980. Capital punishment was one of the central issues considered by
the Congress." A draft resolution called for restriction and eventual abolition of the
death penalty and added that abolition would be "a significant contribution to the
strengthening of human rights, in particular the right to life."'" A controversial
provision urged states that had not abolished capital punishment to "consider
establishing a moratorium in its application, or creating other conditions under
which capital punishment is not imposed or is not executed, so as to permit those
states to study the effects of abolition on a provisional basis." In the past,
opposition to these abolitionist developments had essentially taken the form of
statements claiming states were "not ready" for such progressive positions. But
now, for the first time since the question had been considered by United Nations
bodies, there were strong voices raised in actual support of the death penalty.'
Egypt took the lead, challenging the draft resolution with an "amendment" that
10 See U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.767. The idea of such a study had originally been
suggested by Sweden during the 1957 debate on Article 6 of the draft International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doec. A/C.3/SR.813.
" See Comments of the Chief Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doec. A/C.3/35/SR.74, § 40.
12 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/C.1/L.1. Sponsored by Austria, Ecuador, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Sweden. It was revised following informal discussions. See U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, § 111; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/C.I/L.I/Rev.1. The resolution is
reproduced as an Annex to the Congress Report. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev. I, at
58-60.
'" See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.l, §§ 99-100.
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added preambular paragraphs to the resolution stressing the importance of general
deterrent in providing for penalties, including capital punishment, and referring to
"the importance of providing for capital punishment in order to instill the necessary
fear in the hearts of people. ... ""' Faced with stiff opposition and inadequate time
to complete the discussions, the sponsors withdrew the revised draft resolution. 5
The frustrating session of the Congress in 1980 stirred new abolitionist
initiatives. European states, led by Germany, began to moot the idea of an
abolitionist protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Such an instrument, they suggested, would enable states that had already ratified or
acceded to the Covenant to go beyond the limitations on the death penalty set out
in Article 6 and proclaim its abolition altogether. In 1981, the General Assembly
decided to seek submissions from member states, with a view to a full debate on the
subject at its 1982 session. 6 One of the respondents to this appeal, Pakistan, noted
ominously that abolition of the death penalty was inconsistent with Islamic law.'
This constitutes, according to my research, the first sign of religious arguments in
international debates on the death penalty. Soon the matter would be a common
feature of the debates. In the 1982 General Assembly discussion on the question
of an optional protocol, several countries with a strong Moslem population voted
against the resolution, and in many cases they cited the fact that Islamic law
permitted the death penalty as the justification for their vote. 8 Some of them
abstained for the same reason.'9 Mauritania explained its affirmative vote as being
a mistake, because "it was well known that the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was
in favor of capital punishment.""0 Kuwait said there could be no question of
abolishing the death penalty, which was part of the Kuwaiti religion.2 Two years
later, when the matter returned to the General Assembly, Saudi Arabia, the United
"' U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/C.I/L.9. The amendment is reproduced as an Annex to U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev.1, at 60.
"5 See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.87/14/Rev. 1, § 111; see also ROGER S. CLARK, THE UNITED
NATIONS CRIME PREVENTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM, FORMULATION OF
STANDARDS AND EFFORTS AT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 75 (1994).
6 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/36/L.33/Rev. 1, sponsored by Austria, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Uruguay.
See U.N. Doc. A/37/407, Add.1.
'8 Afghanistan (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.37, § 59); Iran (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, §
49); Iraq (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 53); Jordan (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 48);
Kuwait (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 47); Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 52); Oman (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 45); Somalia (U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 50); Sudan (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 46).
"9 Pakistan (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 67); Tunisia (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, §
67).
20 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/37/SR.67, § 84.
21 See id.
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Arab Emirates, Yemen, Kuwait, and Morocco expressed their support for capital
punishment.22 In 1985, Saudi Arabia joined a consensus in the Commission on
Human Rights concerning drafting of the protocol, but also declared that it would
maintain the right not to abolish the death penalty, as this would run counter to
Islamic law.2"
Work on the protocol continued to progress. Of course, it was never intended
to be anything more than a purely optional instrument, available to those states that
chose to take the extra abolitionist step. But advocates of capital punishment
became increasingly vocal in support of the supreme sanction and in their hostility
to any developments that moved the law forward in this area. By 1988, the debate
on an actual draft had advanced to the General Assembly, where it was considered
by the Third Committee. Several states in favor of capital punishment, almost all
of them countries with a significant Moslem population, expressed their
opposition.24 Several speakers made explicit reference to Islamic law and the
Koran. Saudi Arabia argued that the death penalty was the only fitting sanction for
those who took life, as provided for in Islamic law.25 Jordan maintained that the
death penalty had a positive, deterrent effect.26 Iraq and Morocco implied that there
was a hidden agenda behind the protocol, and that it was aimed at embarrassing or
exerting pressure on states that had not abolished the death penalty. They hastened
to point out that these states constituted the majority of the members of the United
Nations.27 A few Islamic countries preferred to abstain."
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 29, 1989, with fifty-nine votes in favor, twenty-six
votes against, and forty-eight abstentions. Almost all Arab and Islamic states voted
against the text and indeed they were very much at the core of the opposition. 9
Interestingly, however, a few of them abstained: Algeria, Lebanon, and the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya. The Protocol entered into force on July 11, 1991, following its
tenth ratification. As of September 2000, it had more than forty ratifications.
In 1994, Italy proposed a draft resolution in the United Nations General
22 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.44-52, 56, 57, 60.
23 See U.N. Doc. E/1985/95, Corr.1 (in the Second Committee).
24 Egypt (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 7), Afghanistan (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, §
19), Somalia (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 20), Pakistan (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, §
21), Oman (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 18), Iran (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 13),
Indonesia (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 14).
25 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 12.
26 See id. at § 16.
27 See id. at § II (Iraq), § 17 (Morocco).
28 Algeria, in the Third Committee (U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.52, § 10); Democratic
Yemen, in the General Assembly (U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.82).
9 See G.A. Res. 44/128; U.N. Doc. A/44/824; U.N. Doc. A/44/PV.82, at 11.
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Assembly on the issue of the death penalty.3° States who spoke opposing the
resolution included Malaysia,3 ' Bangladesh,32 Sudan,33 Saudi Arabia,34 Libya,35
Egypt,36 Iran," and Jordan.3" During the debate, Sudan described capital
punishment as "a divine right according to some religions, in particular Islam."39
Earlier that year, during the 1994 session of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur on the Sudan, Gaspar Biro, said that so-
called Islamic punishments such as stoning to death for the crime of adultery, run
contrary to the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of
punishment found in Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.4' He was vehemently denounced by the Sudanese representative, Abdelaziz
Shiddo, who accused him of insulting religious values in a "Satanic paragraph" of
his report, adding that "he must assume the responsibility" for his comments. The
report, continued Ambassador Shiddo, was "flagrant blasphemy and a deliberate
insult to the Islamic religion." 4'
Probably the most important international confrontation on capital punishment
took place during the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference. There, Islamic states
allied with countries from the Commonwealth Caribbean to fight the exclusion of
the death penalty from the proposed Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court. In the years of work leading up to the Conference, the issue of capital
punishment had been relatively unimportant, although occasionally one or another
Islamic state would record its dissent with respect to the emerging trend. For
example, in 1996, citing the Islamic legal code of the Shari'a, the representative of
Egypt said that the death penalty should be retained as an option, perhaps where
there were aggravating circumstances.42 There was frequent reference to Islamic
law during the debates at the Rome Conference, and many states implied that
30 See U.N. Doc. A/49/234, Add.1, Add.2 (1994), later revised by U.N. Doc.
A/C.3/49/L.32/Rev.I (1994).
31 See id. at §§ 34-36.
32 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.34, §§ 47-49.
3 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.36, §§ 57-59.
31 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.43, §§ 43-44.
31 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.43, § 53.
36 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.43, §§ 57-60.
37 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.43, §§ 61-62.
31 See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.43, §§ 70-71.
'9 U.N. Doc. A/BUR/49/SR.5, § 13.
o See U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/48.
4' Statement by H.E. Mr. Abdelaziz Shiddo, Minister ofJustice andAttorney-General of
the Republic of the Sudan and Leader of Sudan Delegation to the 50th Session of the
Commission on Human Rights, Commenting on the report of Dr. Gaspar Biro, Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights situation in the Sudan under agenda item (12), Geneva, Feb.
25, 1994; see also U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/122, § 58-64.
42 See U.N. Doc. L/2805.
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countries from "the North" were attempting to impose their own values in criminal
justice. A specific proposal was tabled by Arab and Islamic countries that would
have allowed the international court to impose capital punishment.43 Nevertheless,
there was never more than a small minority of states favorable to including the
death penalty in the Rome Statute. Even many states that enthusiastically and
unashamedly use capital punishment in their domestic systems, such as the United
States of America, readily admitted that because of widespread abolitionist
sentiment it would be impossible to include the death penalty within the sentencing
scheme of the Court.
II. ISLAMIC LAW DOCTRINE ON THE DEATH PENALTY
A stereotypical presentation of Islam suggests that it is a conservative,
misogynistic, and retributive religion. Even those with only a superficial
acquaintance with the subject know better, of course. As in all religions, there are
progressive and reactionary currents of thought. Even so-called "Islamic" states
differ widely on many aspects of religious doctrine. Thus, in the international
debates it is troubling to hear blunt pronouncements affirming that "Islam favors
capital punishment," as if this view meets with unanimous and unqualified support
throughout the Moslem world.
The suggestion from some Islamic states that religious law forbids abolition of
the death penalty constitutes an important obstacle to universal abolition.
Abolitionists would hope to be able to rely upon the humanitarian trends within all
of the world's religions to bolster support for their cause. Indeed, such authorities
can also be found within Islamic texts. Despite popular impressions to the contrary,
Moslem penal law is characterized by a strong undercurrent of clemency and
sympathy for the oppressed. Punishment is ordered to be free of any spirit of
vengeance or torture.4
Islam professes the basic principle that everyone has the right to life. However,
this principle, stated in the Koran, allows for an exception. Killing is only allowed
when a court of law demands it: "Do not kill a Soul which Allah has made sacred
except through the due process of law." Therefore, this exception authorizes the
administration of capital punishment when Islamic law dictates. Intriguingly, the
Islamic law position would seem to be the same as that found in the Fifth
"3 See Proposal Submitted by Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, the Islamic Republic
of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/L.I1 (1998), revised by U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/WGP/
L.I I/Corr.2 (1998).
" See N. Hosni, La Peine de Mort en Droit Egyptien et en Droit Islamique, 58 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PINAL 407, 416 (1987).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution and such international instruments as
the European Convention on Human Rights."5
Islamic law arose out of various sources, but more specifically from the
teachings of the prophet Muhammad. It developed in a formal sense during the
seventh and eighth centuries (670-720 AD).46 Its two most important elements are
the Shari'a and the Fiqh. Shari'a refers to the sacred laws and ways of life
proscribed by Allah. The Koran and the Sunna or Sunnah comprise the Shari'a.
These are considered the most important sources of Islamic law. The Koran is
considered to be the primary source of guidance because it is regarded as the spoken
word of Allah.47 The Sunnah refers to the words and actions of the Prophet.48 The
Shari'a is said to deal with ideology and faith, behavior and manners, and practical
daily matters. It is a comprehensive body of norms covering "every aspect of life
including international, constitutional, administrative, criminal, civil, family, and
religion." '49 The Fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, on the other hand, refers to "the
legal rulings of the Muslim scholars derived from the Shariah. ' 50 The Fiqh is a
second important source of guidance for Islamic law.
Islamic penal law consists of four systems or categories. In the first, that of
Haad or Houdoud, important crimes deemed to threaten the very existence of Islam
are punishable pursuant to penalties set by the Koran itself, or by the Sunna or
Sunnah. Islamic jurists consider that these sanctions are set and immutable, and
conclude that the judge is left with no discretion. Houdoud crimes consist of
adultery, defamation, theft, robbery, rebellion, drunkenness, and apostasy. Several
Houdoud crimes are punishable by death, specifically robbery, adultery, and
apostasy.
The second system, Quissas, concerns intentional crimes against the person.
Its fundamental premise is the lex talionis, that is, "eye for eye, tooth for tooth," and
is set out in the Koran, in verse 5.32 (further developed by verse 17.33). Actually,
the lex talionis appears as early as the Code of Hammurabi. 5' Even then, it was a
"I European Convention on Human Rights, Bel.-Den.-Fr., art. 2 § 1,213 U.N.T.S. 221,
224 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
46 See Joseph Schacht, Problems of Modern Islamic Legislation, 12 STUDIA ISLAMICA
99 (1960), reprinted in ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 515 (Ian Edge ed.; 1996).
4' See J.N.D. Anderson, Law as a Social Force in Islamic Culture and History, 20
BULLETIN OF SOAS 13-40 (1957) (stating that the purpose of punishments as established by
Allah is to deter).
4 See A.J. Wensinck, The Importance of Tradition for the Study of Islam, 11 THE
MOSLEM WORLD 239 (1921), reprinted in ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 46,
at 133.
4' Anderson, supra note 47.
50 Id.
"' See PAUL SAVEY-CASARD, LA PEINE DE MORT: ESQUISSE HISTORIQUE ET JURIDIQUE
4-14 (1968).
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progressive penal reform aimed at enhancing the principle of proportionality,
although it is now seen as a basis for retribution. According to the Koran, it is the
victim or his or her heirs who are to inflict the punishment, although they do this
under the supervision of public authorities. The victims of such crimes may pardon
the offender, in which case the penalty set by Quissas will not be imposed.
In such cases, two other systems of crime and punishment become relevant.
These are Diya, which prescribes restitution or compensation for the victim, and
Tazir, by which public authorities set their own punishment and in which the judge
has wide discretion. Under Tazir, public authorities may provide for capital
punishment, but no religious text requires them to do so.
Under Islamic law, execution should be public in order to enhance its alleged
effect of general deterrence." It is to be carried out with the sword, as a general
rule, except in the case of adultery, where lapidation is employed. 3
Although essentially all Moslem or Islamic countries retain the death penalty
in their domestic law, practice varies considerably from one to another. Some, like
Iran and Iraq, are enthusiastic practitioners,54 while others, such as Tunisia, conduct
executions in only the rarest of cases. The religious argument is invoked frequently,
yet the diversity of practice would suggest there is little consensus even among
Moslems as to the scope of capital punishment. For example, Sudan has taken the
position that offenders may be executed for crimes committed while under the age
of eighteen, "in accordance with provisions of Islamic law."" Yemen, on the other
hand, recently banned the juvenile death penalty, although it was argued that this
step was taken "despite Islamic law."56 The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya recently
informed the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, and
Arbitrary Executions, Ms. Asma Jahangir, that "the aim of the Libyan society is to
52 See Hosni, supra note 44, at 420; see also Exodus 21:14, 22:18.
See A. Wazir, Quelques Aspects de la Peine de Mort en Droit Penal Islamique, 58
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL 421,428 (1987).
14 See Interim report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights in Accordance
with General Assembly Resolution 51/107 and Economic and Social Council Decision
1997/264, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 112(c), U.N. Doc. A/52/472, 19 (2000); Report on the
situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, prepared by the Special
Representative on the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Maurice Copithorne, pursuant
to Commission resolution 1996/84 and Economic and Social Council decision 1996/287,
50th Sess., Provisional Agenda Hem 12 27-29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/63 (1997);
Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1993/71, 53rd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, 77 369-70 (1993).
55 Initial report of state parties due in 1992: Sudan, U.N. Committee on the Rights of
the Child, at § 166, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.3 (1992).
6 Scott Peterson, Despite Islamic Law Yemen Bans Teen Death Penalty, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 2, 2000, at 7.
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abolish the death penalty.""
In 1981, the Islamic Council adopted a Universal Islamic Declaration ofRights,
which states: "(a) Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be
made to protect it. In particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except
under the authority of the law." 8 The final phrase appears to permit capital
punishment and is in any case consistent with the practice of all Islamic states. The
Islamic Conference has prepared a document on human rights and Islam, in which
Article 2 guarantees the right to life to "every human being" adding: "il appartient
aux individus, socidt6s et Etats de prot6ger ce droit contre toute violation 6ventuelle,
et il est interdit de mettre fin A une vie quelconque, sauf lorsque cela est en accord
avec la chari'a."5 9
The Arab Charter of Human Rights, adopted September 15, 1994, but not yet
ratified by any members of the League of Arab States, proclaims the right to life in
the same manner as the other international instruments. However, three distinct
provisions, Articles 10, 11, and 12, recognize the legitimacy of the death penalty in
the case of "serious violations of general law," prohibit the death penalty for
political crimes, and exclude capital punishment for crimes committed under the age
of eighteen and for both pregnant women and nursing mothers for a period of up to
two years following childbirth.6
Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, formerly Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights on Iran, observed that "there are groups of Islamic legal scholars and
practitioners who recommend the abolition of the death penalty for political crimes
on the ground that it is contrary to Islamic law. They state that the number of
crimes punishable by death is limited.' In October 1995, human rights activists
from throughout the Arab world met in Tunis to consider the issue of capital
punishment. The meeting, which featured specialists on religion, philosophy, and
criminal law in Arab states, was a joint initiative of the Arab Institute for Human
Rights and the Citizens and Parliamentarians' League for the Abolition of the Death
Penalty "Hands Off Cain," with the support of the European Community. In a
" Report of the special rapporteur, Ms. Asma Jahangir, submitted pursuant to
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/35, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 11 (b), 72,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/3 (2000).
58 Universal Islamic Declaration of Rights, 4 EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 433
(1982).
. " Organization of the Islamic Conference, Secretary General, doc. OIC/POL/MD/82-
83/7, Djeddah, Apr. 25, 1982.
' See Charte Arabe des Droits de L'Homme, 7 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 212 (1995).
61 Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special
Representative of the Comm 'n on Human Rights, Mr. Reynoldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to
Commission Resolution 1988/69, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, 45th Sess., 26th mtg.
§36, at 12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/26 (1989).
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declaration adopted at the conclusion of the meeting, the participants affirmed their
shared "commitment to the abolition of the death penalty as a strategic move."
They also stated "that within the Arab civilizational and cultural background, no
real impediments exist and obstruct -the evolution, of secular legislations in the
process of setting up limits to the death penalty and abolishing it." The statement
concluded with a call to Arab states to adopt the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which constitutes an
international legal commitment not to impose capital punishment.6
2
CONCLUSION: CAN ISLAMIC LAW EVOLVE?
Conservative Islamic states fighting to retain capital punishment use religious
arguments in order to force the debate into one of cultural or religious norms, where
it appears that one set of moral values is being imposed upon another in a form of
philosophical or cultural imperialism. The argument is disarming for many who
oppose capital punishment in the "North," and seductively demagogic for those who
oppose it in the "South." Of course, the Bible also contemplates capital punishment
for such crimes as magic, violation of the sabbath, blasphemy, adultery,
homosexuality, relations with animals, incest and rape.63 Yet Judeo-Christian
jurists will rarely argue that this ancient text must dictate contemporary legal
practice.
Obviously, there is some basis for the claim that capital punishment is part of
Islamic law. Its.scope, however, is considerably more limited than certain Islamic
states like to claim in international debates. Capital punishment is a mandatory
penalty under the Shari'a for only a small category of crimes. It was plainly
incorrect to assert, as some Islamic states attempted during the negotiations
surrounding the adoption of the Rome Statute, that there was some principle at
stake, because Islamic law in no way mandates capital punishment for the crimes
falling within thejurisdiction ofthe International Criminal Court, namely, genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
It seems unarguable that the crimes for which Islamic law mandates the death
penalty-adultery and apostasy-cannot by any effort at interpretation be deemed
to be the "most serious crimes" for which the death penalty may be imposed in
accordance with Article 6(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. In interpreting the provision, the Human Rights Committee has stated that
imposition of the death penalty for crimes that do not result in loss of human life is
62 See SOURCEBOOK ON THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 233-238 (William A.
Schabas ed., 1997).
63 See Exodus 21:14, 22:18; Leviticus 20:15, 24:13; Deuteronomy 21:21, 22:11,22: 25,
29:13; Numbers 13:5, 17:7, 19:19,22:23,33:14,33:37; see also JEAN IMBERT, LAPEINEDE.
MORT 7-8 (1989).
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contrary to the Covenant.' During its consideration of Iran's periodic report, the
Committee specifically cited imposition of the death penalty for adultery as being
incompatible with the country's international human rights obligations.65 Yet many
of the vocal Islamic states have ratified that instrument without reservations
concerning Article 6(2). In other words, they seem already to have accepted
international norms that are at variance with Islamic law under a strict construction.
Therefore, their argument by which they must obstruct the evolution of international
norms on capital punishment on religious grounds is inconsistent with their previous
practice in the area of international human rights.
Throughout the development of Islam and Islamic law, there have been times
when theory and practice did not coincide. While it has been argued that Islamic
law governs the social order of Islamic societies, this has not prevented the Shari'a
from being amended or ignored when the environment dictated, This has been
referred to as darara, the doctrine of necessity. The doctrine of necessity dispenses
Moslems from observing religious laws when the situation or environment dictates
otherwise.66
One example of this phenomenon is drawn from the realm of international
relations. Islam does not recognize other non-Islamic legal systems because one of
its stated goals is the spread of the Moslem faith. However, the reality of the
modern international system of nations enjoying sovereign rights has prevented this
from being upheld strictly. Consequently, a secular approach to "the conduct of
foreign relations has been accepted by most Islamic states, whether they are
completely secularized in their internal legal structure, as in the case of Turkey, or
still recognizing the Shari'a as their basic law, as in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen."67
Some of the same conservatives who have objected to any deviations from the
internal law of Islam have accepted marked departures from traditional Moslem law
governing foreign relations.68 It might also be noted that Islamic leaders have often
opted to cooperate with foreign governments in the selection of military
technology.69 Even the concept of holy war orjihad, by which religion justifies
aggressive war waged against "infidels" and "enemies of the faith," is so obviously
incompatible with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Interestingly,
at the Rome Diplomatic Conference, the Arab and Islamic states were among the
most insistent for including the crime of aggression within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Yet by the same reasoning that
See U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.25, § 8.
65 See id.
6 See Schacht, supra'note 46, at 101, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, at 517.
67 Majid Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50 AM. J. INT. L. 358, 370
(1956).
68 See id.
69 See id. at 368.
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they claim capital punishment is an inherent aspect of their religion, it might be
argued that any definition of the crime of aggression should also recognize the
legality of holy war. But we are unlikely to hear such an argument.
Family law provides an additional example of social reality superseding Islamic
law. According to one observer, "polygamy, the marriage of minors, the right of the
father to give his children in marriage without their consent, and the right of
husbands to unilaterally and arbitrarily dismiss his wife, have come to be regarded
as inappropriate and impractical."7
All Islamic countries have demonstrated some degree of flexibility in the
interpretation of Islamic law in these or other areas. Yet, they stubbornly refuse to
acknowledge that the same approach may be undertaken with respect to the death
penalty. It appears that religion is little more than a pretext to justify a resort to
harsh penalties that is driven by backward and repressive attitudes in the area of
criminal law.
0 Schacht, supra note 46, at 106, IsLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, at 522.
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